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Introduction
Judicial law clerks have become an accepted and apparently integral part of the
Canadian judicial apparatus. Nonetheless, there is no compelling doctrinal account of
the functions of law clerks. These functions have important implications for how law
clerks are regulated and how their ethical obligations compare to those of lawyers, on
the one hand, and judges, on the other.
The last decade has seen an explosion of Canadian legal literature on public
sector lawyers.1 However, there is little Canadian legal literature on judicial law clerks,
and only some of that is recent.2 Most of this literature focuses on articulating the role
and duties of law clerks,3 and most specifically deals with law clerks at the Supreme
Court of Canada.4 In the only Canadian article that explicitly addresses ethics for law
clerks,5 Josh Wilner argues that law clerks’ ethical duties are “derivative” of those of
their judges because their functions are derivative of those of their judges.6 However,
1

Jennifer Leitch, “A Less Private Practice: Government Lawyers and Legal Ethics” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 315;
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation of Federal Government
Lawyers” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 363; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Government Lawyer as Activist: A Legal
Ethics Analysis” (2020) 41 Windsor Rev Leg & Soc Iss 28; John Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public
Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 756; Andrew Flavelle Martin & Candice Telfer, “The Impact of
the Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government Lawyers: A Duty of Honourable
Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443; Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical
Challenges of Government Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018); Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal
Ethics and the Political Activity of Government Lawyers” (2018) 49:2 Ottawa L Rev 263; Adam Dodek,
“The ‘Unique Role’ of Government Lawyers in Canada” (2016) 49:1 Israel LR 23; Kerry Wilkins,
“Reasoning with the Elephant: The Crown, Its Counsel and Aboriginal Law in Canada” (2016) 13
Indigenous LJ 27; Micah B Rankin, “The Trials, Tribulations and Troubling Revelations of Government
Lawyers in Canada” (2014) 17:2 Leg Ethics 303; Michael H Morris & Sandra Nishikawa, “The Orphans of
Legal Ethics: Why Government Lawyers Are Different—and How We Protect and Promote that Difference
in Service of the Rule of Law and the Public Interest” (2013) 26 Can J Admin L & Prac 171; Patrick J
Monahan, “‘In the Public Interest’: Understanding the Special Role of the Government Lawyer” (2013) 63
SCLR (2d) 43; Malliha Wilson, Taia Wong & Kevin Hille, “Professionalism and the Public Interest” (2011)
38:1 Adv Q 1; Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1 [Dodek, “Intersection”]; John Mark Keyes,
“The Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel” (2009) 3 JPPL 453; Joshua Wilner, “Service to
the Nation: A Living Legal Value for Justice Lawyers in Canada” (2009) 32:1 Dal LJ 177; Allan C
Hutchinson, “‘In the Public Interest’: The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers” (2008) 46:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 105.

2

Joshua Wilner, “To Be or Not to Be?: Some Legal Ethics for Judicial Law Clerks” (2011) 89:3 Can Bar
Rev 611; Lorne Sossin, “The Sounds of Silence: Law Clerks, Policy Making and the Supreme Court of
Canada” (1996) 30:2 UBC L Rev 279; Mitchell McInnes, Janet Bolton & Natalie Derzko, “Clerking at the
Supreme Court of Canada” (1994) 33:1 Alta L Rev 58; Michael John Herman, “Law Clerking at the
Supreme Court of Canada” (1975) 13:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 279.

3

McInnes, Bolton & Derzko, supra note 2; Herman, supra note 2.

4

McInnes, Bolton & Derzko, supra note 2; Herman, supra note 2; Sossin, supra note 2.

5

Wilner, supra note 2. Wilner covers bench memos, confidentiality, impartiality, post-clerkship
employment, and “assessment of prospective law clerk applications”. I will address the middle three issues.

6

Wilner, supra note 2 (“[b]ecause a law clerk assists with a judge’s performance of her public functions,
the clerk’s ethical duties are derivative of the judicial function” at 623). While Wilner, supra note 2
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Wilner is vague and non-committal as to the precise nature of the clerk’s status and
role. Moreover, while the Canadian Judicial Council has jurisdiction over all federally
appointed judges, it has no derivative jurisdiction over law clerks. Wilner’s account
thus implies that law clerks are accountable, if at all, only to their judges as superiors
and to the government as the employer. These kinds of accountability are weak in their
protection of the public interest, particularly insofar as most law clerks are future
lawyers.
In this article, I propose a new doctrinal account or conceptual framework for
the ethical duties of law clerks. I argue that law clerks practice law and thus share the
professional duties applicable to all lawyers. However, the identity and nature of the
court as an institutional client has important implications for those professional duties.
Following and elaborating on my work elsewhere, I argue that the duty to encourage
respect for the administration of justice transposes some of the ethical obligations of
judges into professional obligations of their law clerks as lawyers.7 While the end
result is somewhat similar as under Wilner’s approach, insofar as the duties of law
clerks are similar to or derived from the duties of judges, my framework has a clearer
and sounder doctrinal and legal footing and has important regulatory implications.
This article is organized in four parts. In Part 1, I demonstrate that at least
some of the major functions of law clerks constitute the practice of law—in particular,
recommendations for dispositions of appeals and applications for leave to appeal and
drafting and substantive editing of decisions. Then, in Part 2, I explain that the clerkjudge relationship is best understood as a lawyer-client relationship. While the formal
client is the court as an institution, for practical purposes the client is the judge or
judges to whom the clerk is assigned. In Part 3, I set out the special duties of law clerks.
It is here I make my core argument: that the lawyer’s duty to encourage respect for the
administration of justice transposes at least some of the ethical obligations of the judge
into professional obligations of the law clerk. I argue in Part 4 that purported law
society jurisdiction over law clerks impedes to some extent judicial independence.
While the role of law clerks constitutes the practice of law, courts are thus free to
employ clerks other than lawyers or students-at-law. Finally, I conclude by reflecting
on the implications of my analysis.
I begin with three key points. The first introductory point is a definitional
one. I recognize that law clerks are often articled students, and I include them within

sometimes uses the phrase “legal ethics”, he does not appear to consider law clerks as lawyers and thus to
consider law clerk’s ethics as squarely legal ethics.
7

See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, Ottawa: FLSC, last
amended 19 October 2019, online (pdf): <flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October2019.pdf> [FLSC Model Code] (“[a] lawyer must encourage public respect for and try to improve the
administration of justice”, r 5.6-1,); Martin, supra note 1 (“[i]n effect, the rules and laws governing the
political activity of judges and members of courts and tribunals are transposed into professional obligations
of their counsel” at 291–92). See also Part 3 below, especially notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
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my meaning of “lawyer”—as do the rules of professional conduct.8 For the purposes
of this article, the professional duties of lawyers and articled students are identical.
Second, if judicial law clerks among other things practice law (as I will argue
in Part 1), and the clerk-judge relationship is among other things a lawyer-client one
(as I will argue in Part 2), why are a law clerk’s professional duties as lawyers defining
and dominant—as opposed, for example, to their duties as employees? The
professional duties as lawyers are defining and dominant because they are the most
immutable and definitive: lawyers cannot contract out of them and, with few
exceptions, clients cannot relieve lawyers from them. They are also stringent.
Moreover, the fact that lawyers provide legal advice alongside other services to the
same client does not negate, and indeed may complicate, their professional duties as
lawyers. My analysis is grounded in the functions performed by law clerks, not their
status. I argue that the defining characteristic of law clerks’ ethical duties is that all
law clerks practice law, even though not all law clerks are lawyers or articled students.
Thus, law clerks’ ethics are not severable from the definition of the practice of law.
The third introductory point is that my focus here is on the ethics of Canadian
law clerks under Canadian law. While there is abundant literature on law clerks in
other common law jurisdictions (particularly the US),9 like the Canadian literature, it
focuses more on the roles and duties and selection of law clerks and their legitimacy,10
8

See FLSC Model Code, supra note 7 at r 1.1-1 (“‘lawyer’ means a member of the Society and includes a
law student registered in the Society’s pre-call training program”).

9

But see e.g. Katharine G Young, “Open Chambers: High Court Associates and Supreme Court Clerks
Compared” (2007) 31:2 Melbourne UL Rev 646; Abhinav Chandrachud, “From Hyderabad to Harvard:
How US Law Schools Make It Worthwhile to Clerk on India’s Supreme Court” (2014) 21:1 Intl J Leg
Profession 73.

10

See e.g. Paul R Baier, “The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution” (1973) 26:6 Vand L Rev 1125; Eugene
A Wright, “Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks” (1973) 26:6 Vand L Rev 1179;
Lynn K Rhinehart, “Is There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk Selection Process?” (1995) 83:2 Geo
LJ 575; Christopher Avery et al, “The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks” (2001) 68:3 U Chicago L
Rev 793; David R Stras, “The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process” (2006) 85 Tex L Rev 947, reviewing Todd C Peppers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise
and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) and Artemus
Ward & David L Weiden, Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme
Court (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Mark W Pletcher & Ludovic C Ghesquiere, “In
Restraint of Trade: The Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Plan” (2007) 78:1 U Colo L Rev 147; Christopher Avery
et al, “The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks” (2007) 74:2 U Chicago L Rev 447; Todd C Peppers
& Christopher Zorn, “Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment”
(2008) 58:1 DePaul L Rev 51; Todd C Peppers, Michael W Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, “Inside Judicial
Chambers: How Federal District Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks” (2008) 71:2 Alb L Rev
623; Carolyn Shapiro, “The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology in the Supreme
Court” (2009) 37:1 Fla St U L Rev 101; William E Nelson et al, “The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme
Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?” (2009) 62:6 Vand L Rev 1747; Todd C Peppers,
Michael W Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, “Surgeons or Scribes?: The Role of United States Court of
Appeals Law Clerks in Appellate Triage” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 313; Timothy R Johnson, David R Stras
& Ryan C Black, “Advice from the Bench (Memo): Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Oral Arguments”
(2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 21; Ryan C Black, Christina L Boyd & Amanda C Bryan, “Revisiting the Influence
of Law Clerks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 75; Stephen
L Wasby, “The World of Law Clerks: Tasks, Utilization, Reliance, and Influence” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev
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especially at apex courts, than on their ethics.11 Without denying the value of
comparative work, this article uses a Canadian-centric approach.12
Part 1: The nature of clerks’ duties: Judicial law clerks practice law
The existing Canadian legal literature on law clerks does not explicitly address the
question of whether law clerks practice law, or the related question of whether the
legal and professional obligations of lawyers apply to law clerks. In order to identify
and understand the ethical obligations of law clerks, and indeed whether legal ethics—
including the law of lawyering—applies to them, these questions must first be
answered. I do so in this part. I start by considering definitions of the practice of law.
I then identify how, based on existing accounts in the legal literature, at least some of
the major work of law clerks constitutes the practice of law. Indeed, it is this functional
characterization that grounds my doctrinal account. That is, I argue that the defining
characteristic is that all law clerks practice law, even though not all law clerks are
lawyers or articled students.
There is some variation among the provinces and territories around the
definition of the practice of law. Most statutes on the legal profession provide a
definition, or examples, or both. The most concise definition comes from Nova Scotia:
The practice of law is the application of legal principles and judgement with
regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person that requires the
knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law, and includes any of the
following conduct on behalf of another:
(a) giving advice or counsel to persons about the persons
legal rights or responsibilities or to the legal rights or
responsibilities of others;
(b) selecting, drafting or completing legal documents or
agreements that affect the legal rights or responsibilities
of a person;
111; Albert Yoon, “Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary” (2014) 98 Marq L
Rev 131; John J Szmer, Erin B Kaheny & Robert K Christensen, “Taking a Dip in the Supreme Court Clerk
Pool: Gender-Based Discrepancies in Clerk Selection” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 261; Christopher D
Kromphardt, “Fielding an Excellent Team: Law Clerk Selection and Chambers Structure at the U.S.
Supreme Court” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 289; Lawrence Baum, “Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks:
Probing the Ideological Linkage between Judges and Justices” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 333; Tony Mauro,
“Diversity and Supreme Court Law Clerks” (2014) 98:1 Marq L Rev 361; Adam Bonica et al, “The Political
Ideologies of Law Clerks” (2017) 19:1 Am L & Econ Rev 96.
11

But see e.g. John Paul Jones, “Some Ethical Considerations for Judicial Clerks” (1991) 4:4 Geo J Leg
Ethics 771; David Lane, “Bush v. Gore, Vanity Fair, and a Supreme Court Law Clerk’s Duty of
Confidentiality” (2005) 18:3 Geo J Leg Ethics 863; Charles W Sorenson, Jr, “Are Law Clerks Fair Game?
Invading Judicial Confidentiality” (2008) 43:1 Val U L Rev 1; Chandrachud, supra note 9 at 80.
12
See e.g. Adam Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last” (2008) 46
Osgoode Hall LJ 1 (“Canadian legal ethics must also attempt to situate legal ethics within a distinctly
Canadian context” at 7).
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(c) representing a person before an adjudicative body
including, but not limited to, preparing or filing
documents or conducting discovery;
(d) negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of
a person.13

Legislation in the other provinces and territories is to similar effect but tends to provide
more examples.14
From what little has been written in the Canadian legal literature, the role and
duties of a judicial law clerk are fairly clear, at least at the Supreme Court of Canada.
Michael John Herman lists eight duties of Supreme Court of Canada law clerks:
“[p]reparation of ‘bench memoranda’”, i.e. “a memorandum of fact and law… the
Justice will carry it with him onto the bench for purposes of reference”;15 “[a]ttendance
at the oral hearing”;16 “[p]articipating in the judicial decisions”;17 “[l]egal research”;18
“[p]reparing draft reasons”;19 and “[e]diting the draft judgment”.20 Herman
emphasizes that the last function, editing, “is perhaps the most valuable service that
the clerk can perform.”21 He also includes a ninth potential duty: oral or written
recommendations on applications for leave to appeal.22
Similarly, Mitchell McInnes, Janet Bolton & Natalie Derzko observe that
“[t]he primary duties [of law clerks] continue to include the preparation of leave
memoranda and bench memoranda, and the provision of assistance in the drafting of
reasons for judgment.”23 In the same vein, Sossin writes that “[p]robably the most
important role of law clerks at the Supreme Court—and the one least susceptible to

13

Legal Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28, s 16(1) [emphasis added].

14

See e.g. Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 (“[f]or the purposes of this Act, a person provides legal services
if the person engages in conduct that involves the application of legal principles and legal judgment with
regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person”, s 1(5); s 1(6) gives examples that include “[g]ives a
person advice with respect to the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of the person or of another person”
and “[s]elects, drafts, completes or revises, on behalf of a person, … a document that affects the legal
interests, rights or responsibilities of a person”).

15

Herman, supra note 2 at 280–81. See also Wilner, supra note 2 (who refers to bench memos as “the main
work product of law clerks” at 633).

16

Herman, supra note 2 at 281–82.

17

Ibid at 282–83.

18

Ibid at 283–84.

19

Ibid at 284–85.

20

Ibid at 285–86

21

Ibid at 285.

22

Ibid at 286.

23

McInnes, Bolton & Derzko, supra note 2 at 61.
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generalizations—is the drafting of bench memoranda”.24 He also notes that, where the
judge writes reasons in a given case, “the law clerk who prepared the bench
memorandum will be asked to undertake some supplementary research on particularly
complex issues, to edit a draft of an opinion prepared by the Justice or to work on a
draft of the reasons in the case.”25
In some respects, the work of law clerks clearly does not constitute the
practice of law. To the extent that leave memos or bench memos are merely summaries
of the materials filed, this clerical work, while requiring knowledge and skill, is not
the practice of law. Likewise, to the extent that editing judgments is a matter of style
and proofreading, it too is not the practice of law. Moreover, a bare statement of the
law is arguably legal information and not legal advice, and thus pure legal research
may not constitute the practice of law.
However, without explicitly stating that law clerks practice law, the Canadian
literature on law clerks reveals that they typically exceed this clerical work. For
example, in his discussion of leave memos, Sossin generalizes that “[t]he memo
concludes by recommending whether or not the case should be granted leave.”26 As
Sossin also explains, the test for leave is set out in the Supreme Court Act.27 In applying
subsection 40(1) to the facts of the leave application, and expressing a conclusion
(recommendation or not) as to whether the legal test is met, the law clerk is providing
legal advice and thus practicing law. Sossin is correct that this test is “extremely vague
and largely subjective” and that “[f]ew clerks have enough experience, or are given
enough guidance, to credibly and consistently apply a standard of ‘national
importance’.”28 It is nonetheless a legal test and the law clerk is providing a legal
conclusion. In the words of the Nova Scotia legislation, the law clerk is applying “legal
principles and judgement with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person
that requires the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law” and more

24

Sossin, supra note 2 at 292.

25

Ibid at 296.

26

Ibid at 289. See also McInnes, Bolton & Derzko, supra note 2 (“the clerks pre-screen the applications and
provide recommendations as to dispositions…. The most important, and typically longest, part of the memo
examines whether or not the application should be granted [emphasis added]” at 71–72).
27

See Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 40(1):
[T]he Supreme Court is of the opinion that any question involved therein is, by reason of its public
importance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in
that question, one that ought to be decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of
such a nature or significance as to warrant decision by it.

See also e.g. for the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c 43 (“[a]n appeal lies
to the Court of Appeal from … an order of the Divisional Court, on a question that is not a question of fact
alone, with leave of the Court of Appeal as provided in the rules of court”, s 6(1)(a)).
28

Sossin, supra note 2 at 289, 291.
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specifically “giving advice or counsel to persons about the persons legal rights or
responsibilities or to the legal rights or responsibilities of others”.29
Likewise, in his discussion of bench memos, Sossin explains that bench
memos not only “summarize the relevant arguments” but also “offer recommendations
based on a thorough review of the applicable law.”30 While the former is clerical work,
the latter is the development and expression of a legal opinion and thus the practice of
law.
There is a similar dichotomy in law clerks’ drafting and editing of judgments.
Where editing is simply proofreading, it is clerical work. However, where editing
involves confirming that the statements of law are correct, including that the cases
relied on are still good law, that editing is arguably the practice of law. Sossin asserts
that law clerks often go beyond editing and actually draft reasons.31 He elaborates that
clerks’ work goes beyond a statement of the law to provide an “opinion”, which using
the criteria above I would characterize as a legal opinion about the legal rights and
responsibilities of a person:
First, clerks are expected to give accurate statements of the law in a
particular area or with respect to particular circumstances. Second, clerks
are expected to give an opinion as to whose view of the proper law—the
appellant’s, the respondent's or an intervenor’s—should carry the day. In
other words, clerks are asked to both express an opinion of their own and
to summarize objectively the opinions of others.32

A court’s decision is a legal document and is, at least in the Canadian common law
jurisdictions, law as much as a statute is law. Thus, drafting a decision likewise
involves the application of the law to the facts and the giving of a legal conclusion.
Even where the conclusion has been specified by the judge, the clerk in providing the
draft is implicitly stating that the analysis supports the conclusion.
Based on this application of the definition of the practice of law to the existing
descriptions of law clerks’ duties, at least some of the major duties of law clerks
constitute the practice of law. For the reasons I discussed in the introduction, legal
ethics should thus predominate in law clerks’ ethics.

29

Legal Profession Act, supra note 13, s 16(1).

30

Sossin, supra note 2 at 292 [emphasis added]. See also Wilner, supra note 2 (“[i]t is commonly recognized
that when clerks prepare bench memos for their judges they are giving them legal ‘advice’” at 622). See
also McInnes, Bolton & Derzko, supra note 2 (a bench memo “assists a judge in determining the more
difficult question of how an appeal should be decided” at 74). See also Wilner, supra note 2 (“the purpose
of a bench memo is not to convince the judge as how to decide the case but instead to lay a foundation for
a decision, to facilitate a decision” at 633).

31

Sossin, supra note 2 at 296.

32

Ibid at 302.
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How, then, can this conclusion be reconciled with the fact that at least some
courts do not require judicial law clerks to be articled students or lawyers?33 I certainly
do not suggest that these courts are condoning the unlawful unlicensed practice of law.
There are two possible answers. The more conservative answer is that such law clerks,
i.e. those who are not articled students or lawyers, are implicitly acting under the
supervision of a lawyer at the court, for example the executive legal officer or a staff
lawyer.34 The FLSC Model Code recognizes that lawyers may delegate functions to
non-lawyers other than articled students, though the lawyer maintains “complete
professional responsibility” and “must directly supervise” those non-lawyers.35 This
answer is problematic insofar as non-lawyers cannot, among other things, “give legal
advice”, “act finally without reference to the lawyer in matters involving professional
legal judgment”, or “sign correspondence containing a legal opinion”.36 Moreover, as
a factual matter, the actual extent of this implicit supervision is unclear.
A bolder and better answer is that legislation on the legal profession, and the
codes adopted by law societies under that legislation, do not apply to courts, including
their law clerks in the performance of their duties, because such application is at least
largely inconsistent with judicial independence. I will return to this argument below
in Part 4.
Admittedly, if the legislatures were convinced that a judicial clerkship is a
sufficiently special public role, they would be free to amend legislation on the legal
profession to add an exception to the definition of the practice of law.37 (Indeed, for
the purpose of law society regulation, the practice of law is whatever the legislature
defines it as.) For example, legislation in some provinces explicitly provides that
politicians may advocate on behalf of their constituents without practicing law.38
However, given the long history of judicial clerkships in Canada, one can infer that

33

See e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court, and the Ontario Court of Appeal.

34

While the duties of these lawyers also warrant further study, they are beyond the scope of this article.

35

FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 6.1-1. See also ibid (“[in] this rule, a non-lawyer does not include a
student-at-law”, r 6.1-2); Black v Law Society (Alberta), [1989] 1 SCR 591, 58 DLR (4th) 317, La Forest J
(“[i]t must be remembered that the member lawyer takes full responsibility for the work of a non-member,
whether that non-member be a student, a paralegal, or a lawyer from another jurisdiction, and to fulfill his or her
obligations to the law society the member lawyer must adequately supervise all work done in his or her name”
at 628–29 of SCR).
36

FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 6.1-3(b), (d), (k).

37

In some jurisdictions this could be done by regulation. See e.g. Legal Profession Act, supra note 13 (“this
Act does not prohibit … (l) any other person or class of persons permitted by the regulations made by the
Council and approved by the Governor in Council to carry on one or more of the activities referred to in
subsection (1)”, s 16(4)).
38

See e.g. ibid (“[the Legal Profession Act] does not prohibit … (j) a member of (i) the House of Commons
of Canada, (ii) the House of Assembly, or (iii) a council of a municipality, from acting as an advocate or
representative of a person in the member’s capacity as an elected representative; (k) a member of the Senate
of Canada from acting as an advocate or representative of a person in that member's capacity as a Senator”,
ss 16(4)(j), (k)).
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the legislatures have declined the opportunity to do so. If, however, the implications
of my analysis are undesirable, then such an amendment would be appropriate.
Part 2: The nature of the clerk-judge relationship: A lawyer-client relationship
The clerk-judge relationship is amorphous in the existing Canadian literature.
However, given my conclusion that law clerks practice law, I argue that it is correctly
understood as a lawyer-client relationship.
I start by considering the legal or technical nature of the clerk-judge
relationship. Wilner notes that “[t]he [judge-clerk] relationship has several facets,
including employer-employee, teacher-student, client-lawyer, and lawyer-lawyer….
The relationship between judges and clerks is an odd, paradoxical mix of partnership
and subservience, collaboration and subordination.”39 However, understanding the
ethics and professionalism obligations of law clerks requires precision about the
dominant characteristic of their relationship with judges. The court may resemble a
firm—with the judges as partners and the clerks as associates—or, potentially, a
collection of firms sharing space, with each firm consisting of a judge and her clerks.
Judges, however, are not lawyers. As the clerk is providing, among other things, legal
advice, there must be a lawyer-client relationship and thus a client. Therefore, the
situation is best understood as the law clerks being in-house counsel either to the court
as an institutional client or to the individual judge.
While the clerk-judge relationship may be an unusual or even non-traditional
lawyer-client relationship, that does not mean it cannot be a lawyer-client relationship.
Wilner argues that the relationship is not a typical lawyer-client one because “clients
are not normally more experienced in the law than their lawyer is” (which is true, but
does not preclude the judge being a client) and that “it is inaccurate to describe a judge
as a client, at least a traditional kind of client…. [A] clerk assigned to a particular judge
is employed to assist the judge in performing a public function, rather than to represent
the judge’s personal interests.”40 Interestingly, Wilner concludes that “the clerk’s
professional role seems more akin to that of a government lawyer than to that of a
lawyer representing a private client.”41 (He goes on to imagine that the client may be
“even perhaps ‘the law’ itself”,42 a characterization that is so abstract as to be
unhelpful.) I note that despite the differences between private practice and government
practice, a government lawyer is a lawyer, and the client of a government lawyer is a
client—i.e., to say that a law clerk is like a government lawyer is to say that she
practices law in a lawyer-client relationship. The law clerk has a specific client, and
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Wilner, supra note 2 at 620.

40

Ibid at 622.
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that client remains free to provide instructions to the law clerk and accept or reject the
law clerk’s advice.
As Wilner notes, however, there is “an ambiguity as to whether a law clerk’s
‘client’ is his particular judge or rather the court as an institutional whole.”43 The
nature of, and parties to, the relationship have implications for the ethical duties of law
clerks, such as the law clerk’s duty of confidentiality.44 As Wilner notes,
confidentiality is essential to the role of the law clerk.45 If each law clerk is counsel to
the individual judge, then lawyer-client confidentiality applies as among the law clerks
and as among the judges, with the possibility of a joint retainer where a law clerk
works on a single matter for more than one judge.46 On the other hand, if each law
clerk is counsel to the court as a whole, there is no confidentiality as among the law
clerks and as among the judges, with the possibility of different lawyers within the
same “firm” representing both sides to a matter.47 (Of course, even if the court is a
collective, individual judges can impose additional obligations of confidentiality on
their law clerks as a matter of contract or undertakings.48) For example, Herman notes
that “[t]he Judges promote the clerks’ practice of discussing cases amongst
themselves…. But the employers’ thoughts are disclosed only to aid the fuller
discussion of the case and the better formulation of a legal solution. This limited
sharing of the judicial confidence is ordinarily permissible.”49 Similarly, Sossin notes
that “[p]erhaps as influential as the discussions between clerks and their Justices are
the discussions among the law clerks themselves.”50 Wilner, however, observes that
“[s]ome judges encourage this, while others do not permit it.” 51
Here a comparison to government lawyers is helpful. The government lawyer
represents an institutional client, the Crown. However, on a day-to-day basis, the
government lawyer receives instructions from, and provides legal advice and services
to, a particular ministry or department, and confidentiality typically applies as against
43

Ibid.

44

Ibid addresses confidentiality at 637–39. Ironically, the law clerk has an explicit obligation of
confidentiality, but the judge does not. See Stephen GA Pitel & Liam Ledgerwood, “Judicial Confidentiality
in Canada” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 123.
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Wilner, supra note 2 at 637.

46

See FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 3.4-5.
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See ibid (“[w]here there is no dispute among the clients about the matter that is the subject of the proposed
representation, two or more lawyers in a law firm may act for current clients with competing interests and
may treat information received from each client as confidential and not disclose it to the other clients,
provided that…”, r 3.4-4).
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other ministries or departments. Likewise, though the client of the law clerk is the
court as an institutional whole, he or she is assigned to provide services to a particular
judge or judges who are the de facto clients. As the formal client is the court itself, it
is ultimately up to the court to determine how confidentiality and other considerations
will apply when clerks are assigned to specific judges.
Part 3: The ethical duties of law clerks
Having established that law clerks practice law, and noted that the clerk-judge
relationship is a lawyer-client one, I can now explain how and why the ethical duties
of law clerks are professional duties of lawyers. At first glance, this may seem like a
hybrid set of duties, combining the professional duties of a lawyer and the ethical
duties of a judge. However, law clerks are not judges.52 The law clerk practices law in
a lawyer-client relationship and thus shares the professional duties applicable to all
lawyers. But the identity and nature of the client (whether the court, formally, or the
individual judge, in practice) has important implications for those professional duties
or imposes additional professional duties: at least some of the duties applicable to
judges are transposed onto their lawyers via the duty to encourage respect for the
administration of justice.
This approach has some overlap with Wilner’s approach, under which the
positions and functions of the lawyer are “derivative” of those of the judge,53 and so
the duties of the law clerk are likewise “derivative” of the duties of the judge:
The nature of their [clerks’] participation is derivative of their professional
relationship with their judge and their judge’s duties. Clerks’ functions are
completely dependent upon their judges’ functions. That clerks are judicial
agents explains the similarities between legal ethics for law clerks and
judicial ethics.54

He later notes that “[i]t is this aspect of the relationship—the fact that law clerks are
‘personal extensions’ of the judge—which explains the link between judicial ethics
and law clerks’ ethics… Clerks are the trusted agents of ‘their’ judge, and as such
clerks may be bound by the judicial standards binding their principal.”55 Wilner argues
52

See e.g. ibid at 612, 621, 622.
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See e.g. ibid at 612:
That law clerks’ ethics tracks some of the basic concerns in judicial ethics reflects a fundamental
tension inherent in the clerkship institution, namely, that clerks are not judges even though their
functions overlap with those of judges. That tension arises not because clerks are “parajudges,”
but because their functions are derivative of the judicial function, arising out of and dependent
upon the judicial office held by the judge they serve [citation omitted].
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Ibid at 616. See also ibid (“[t]he derivative character of the law clerk’s responsibilities, being dependant
on the judicial function, explains the interrelated and overlapping nature of law clerk ethics and judicial
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that “clerks themselves have public duties flowing from the judicial office held by the
judge whom they serve.”56 Indeed, he is explicit that “[t]he agent must adopt and live
up to the ethical standards of his principal”.57 He argues that “[t]he law clerk’s duty is
derivative of the judge’s duty, and the judge is tasked with enforcing it”58 and refers
to “ethical obligations” and “public obligations” interchangeably.59
I argue instead that it is the duty to encourage respect for the administration
of justice that does the deriving or extending of judges’ duties into lawyer’s duties,
within a relationship that is not solely agent-principal but more specifically lawyerclient.60 In general, duties of the client do not always, or even often, automatically
become duties of the lawyer.61 The lawyer’s duty to encourage respect for
administration of justice is the mechanism by which ethical duties of the judge become
professional duties of the law clerk.
The Model Code of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada provides that
“[a] lawyer must encourage public respect for and try to improve the administration of
justice.”62 While this duty is not often the subject of disciplinary proceedings, they
typically involve “unsupported allegations of bias or wrongdoing against judges or
courts.”63 In contrast, law clerks by their actions may discourage public respect for the
administration of justice not because they allege wrongdoing but because clerks and
their functions are closely connected to their courts and judges and unavoidably reflect
on them in the perception of the legal profession and the public. Thus, “[i]n effect, the
rules and laws governing … judges and members of courts and tribunals are transposed
into professional obligations of their counsel.”64
In order to determine the content of these additional professional duties, the
relevant question is whether the absence or breach of such duties would discourage
respect for the administration of justice in the mind of a reasonably informed member
of the public, given the substantive nature of the work done by law clerks and their
close working relationships with their judges. As Wilner puts it, “[e]verything a clerk
56
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Ibid at 621.
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government counsel with the legal obligations of clients” at 530), quoted in Andrew Flavelle Martin &
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does reflects back on his or her judge.”65 For example, Wilner notes that “[t]he
justification for the requirement that law clerks be impartial… would seem to be rooted
entirely in the detrimental manner in which a biased clerk would reflect on the
perception of the judge’s role in administering justice.”66
The archetype here is political activity. Judges are restricted from engaging
in political activity in order to promote their impartiality and public confidence in that
impartiality.67 Political activity by law clerks would appear, to a reasonably informed
member of the public, to detract from the impartiality or the appearance of impartiality
of the judges who those lawyers serve.68 Thus, under the analysis set out above, judges’
ethical duty to refrain from political activity is transposed into a professional duty of
the their law clerks to likewise refrain.
Before proceeding further, I note that one rule of professional conduct has
particular importance given the nature of the clerk’s function. Because not all of a
clerk’s duties constitute the practice of law or giving legal advice, clerks should be
particularly careful to distinguish their legal advice from their non-legal advice.69
I acknowledge that many of the professional duties of law clerks are the same
as those of all lawyers. However, some of these duties have special implications for
law clerks. Some of these special duties apply to the conduct of law clerks after they
have left the court. But one of the most important—a bar on political activity and
constraints on other civic and charitable activity—applies only during their service to
the judiciary.
3A. The ethical duties of law clerks: Impartiality and outside interests
Like political activity, other outside interests raise problems for law clerks in the same
way that they raise problems for judges.70 Law clerks share their judges’ obligations
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Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges, Ottawa: CJC, 2004, at 28, principle d(1), online
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of impartiality—they “must not only be impartial but also be seen to be.”71 Partiality
or partisanship by law clerks calls into question the impartiality of their judges.
An important example of these problems is fundraising. Fundraising by
judges raises several concerns, primarily about buying influence with, or preferential
access to, the judges involved.72 As Pitel & Malecki put it: “[a] common concern… is
that donors (which may include lawyers and potential litigants appearing before a
judge) may contribute with the expectation that they will receive future favours from
the soliciting judge in return for their generosity.”73 There is a further concern that
judges will become “publicly identifie[d] … with the objectives of the organization
for whom the solicitations were made…. this heightens the risk that the public could
question the judge’s neutrality.”74 Similarly there is concern that solicitation by a judge
“may cause people to feel intimidated or coerced into donating.”75 Thus, the Canadian
Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles for Judges provides that “[j]udges should not
solicit funds (except from judicial colleagues or for appropriate judicial purposes) or
lend the prestige of judicial office to such solicitations.”76 Fundraising by their law
clerks raises similar concerns. Here law clerks should also be guided by the rules of
professional conduct on outside interests: “[a] lawyer must not allow involvement in
an outside interest to impair the exercise of the lawyer’s independent judgment on
behalf of a client.”77
Wilner’s conclusion is that law clerks “must be prudent in any civic,
charitable, and political activities in which they take part.”78 I have observed elsewhere
that in the context of political activity, however,79 mere prudence seems insufficient
for law clerks, and they are better advised to refrain completely. It is worth
emphasizing here that Ethical Principles for Judges treats political activity, and
particularly partisan political activity, differently than other civic and charitable
activities. Such civic and charitable activities may be permissible for judges, and so
for those activities prudence is an appropriate and sufficient approach for law clerks.
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3B. The ethical duties of law clerks: Post-service restrictions
Judges face restrictions on their return to the practice of law.80 Although there is
variation among the provinces and territories, the FLSC Model Code provides that a
former judge cannot, in the three years following her departure from a court, appear
before that court or any court or tribunal over which that court has jurisdiction.81
Should their law clerks also face restrictions when they leave a court?
Of course, the general rule on appearing in front of judges with whom a
lawyer has a close relationship will apply to former law clerks:
When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not: … appear before a judicial
officer when the lawyer, the lawyer’s associates or the client have business
or personal relationships with the officer that give rise to or might
reasonably appear to give rise to pressure, influence or inducement affecting
the impartiality of the officer, unless all parties consent and it is in the
interests of justice[.]82

The application of this rule turns on the nature of the relationship between the judge
and the law clerk. Wilner notes that some judges impose a “cooling-off period” during
which they will not allow their former clerks to appear before them.83 But what about
other judges of the same court, or judges of inferior courts?
On one level, law clerks are differently situated than judges. Unlike the longterm career that comes from a judicial appointment, service as a law clerk is transient,
even fleeting.84 Law clerks are near the beginning of their legal careers.85 In contrast,
retired judges receive considerable pensions.86 Restrictions on post-service court
appearances would be a considerable deterrent from taking a clerkship, particularly for
potential clerks whose career plans contemplate litigation.
At the same time, some of the reasons to be wary of judges returning to
practice do also apply to their law clerks. Parties and their counsel might be at a
perceived or actual disadvantage when facing opposing counsel who recently served
the Court in which they are appearing. As Pitel & Bortolin put it, “[o]ne concern
80
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associated with former judges is that their arguments before a court will be more
persuasive than they ought to be.”87 While Pitel & Bortolin argue that such special
influence is unlikely in reality, they note that the public might perceive it, and so the
restriction is necessary to protect the appearance of impartiality.88 The same concern,
although lesser in degree, would seem to apply to law clerks appearing in front of the
court they served. Lawyers who have recently acted as the court’s trusted advisors
conceivably have more credibility and persuasiveness than other lawyers.
On the other hand, there is little reason to think that this concern would apply
to judges of courts inferior to or superior to the court in which a law clerk served.
These judges have had no interaction with, and no relationship with, the former law
clerk.
Given the short-term nature of law clerks’ service, and the danger of deterring
applicants from such service, a cooling-off period would be preferable to a permanent
prohibition. Pitel & Bortolin argue that such periods for former judges are an arbitrary
and absurd compromise between a permanent prohibition and no prohibition.89
However, for former law clerks, such an arbitrary period, perhaps of one year, has an
important symbolic value and promotes public confidence in the administration of
justice. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada’s Confidentiality and Conflict of
Interest Declaration provides that “[f]ormer law clerks shall not, within a period of
two years after terminating their clerkship, without consent of a judge, appear as
counsel in any proceeding before the Supreme Court of Canada.”90 Such a period
would be more important for clerks at lower courts, given the rarity of a recently-called
lawyer appearing at the Supreme Court of Canada.
In contrast, prohibitions on soliciting post-service practice opportunities are
equally warranted—though not equally feasible—for law clerks as they are for
judges.91 As Pitel & Bortolin note, there is nothing specific in Ethical Principles for
Judges that “would prohibit judges from negotiating employment with parties to a
dispute or their lawyers… [a]lthough this is already an obvious violation of judicial
ethics principles”.92 As Wilner notes, law clerks doing the same creates “possible
conflicts of interests and the appearance of impropriety”.93 While Wilner does not
advocate an absolute prohibition, he suggests that “[w]hen in doubt, during their
87
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employment it would be prudent for clerks to inform their judges about any potential
conflicts of interest raised by their job hunting.”94 Here too a cooling-off period would
promote public confidence in the administration of justice. But in the age of the megafirm, a law clerk serving for a single year would be de facto prevented from seeking
employment. While I appreciate the concurrence by Cory J in MacDonald v Martin
Estate that “[n]either the merger of law firms nor the mobility of lawyers can be permitted
to affect adversely the public's confidence in the judicial system.”95 I acknowledge that
such a cooling-off period for law clerks would be impractical in practice and
destructive to the institution of clerking.
Law clerks also face restrictions on public comment following their service.
During their service, law clerks have a clear duty to avoid public comment because of
their duties of loyalty and confidentiality.96 But what about after their departure from
the court?
It is generally understood that judgments speak for themselves and judges
should not comment on their previous cases: “The rule that judges should speak, or
explain themselves, only once, through their judgments, is a wise and salutary one,
based on the long experience of the common law…. They are expected to speak only
through their Reasons for Judgment, and thereafter never to explain their judgments.”97
Indeed, this is one of the dangers considered by Pitel & Bortolin for judges returning
to court and potentially arguing against one of their previous decisions.98 A similar
concern appears to apply to former law clerks who become litigators or academics,
which are two very common careers for former law clerks.99 Can a litigator, or an
academic, argue or write about decisions that they worked on? What about decisions
by the same judge during the law clerk’s service? What about decisions by other judges
of the same court? This situation invokes both the duty of confidentiality and the
broader duty of loyalty to clients, both present and former.100
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The identity of the judges who wrote a decision forms part of the reasons and
is readily apparent on its face in a way that the identity of the law clerks who worked
on a decision is not. However, the identity of a judge’s clerk and their dates of service
are readily available. While technically the identity of a client and the nature of the
services provided are privileged and confidential,101 many law clerks are open with the
names of the judge(s) for whom they worked, both during and after their service.
Here an analogy can be drawn to the duty of a lawyer not to comment on the
strength of a client’s case.102 The former law clerk has, or may be perceived as having,
inside knowledge about the intended meaning and interpretation of a decision on
which she worked as well as its potential weaknesses. Attacking the credibility or
applicability of such a decision undoes the work for which the lawyer was
responsible.103
On the other hand, a litigator is not free to simply ignore such decisions or
pretend that they do not exist; indeed, such an approach would violate the duty of
competence to the current client.104
The best course for the former law clerk, in any situation where a decision
issued by the court during their service is relevant, is to choose their words carefully,
avoid speculating as to the judge’s intended meaning, and avoid insofar as possible
commenting on the merits of the decision. This is most important when the decision is
one in which the law clerk was involved, but is also advisable for any decision of the
judge(s), and even the court, for which the law clerk worked during that service.
3C. The ethical duties of law clerks: The duty to report fellow lawyers to the law
society
I have argued above that law clerks have some special professional duties, flowing
from their professional duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice.
101
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Before moving on, it is important to emphasize that, and how, another of the
professional duties of all lawyers applies to law clerks: the duty to report fellow
lawyers to the law society. This is an example of how the duties of law clerks diverge
from, rather than converge with, the duties of their judges. Put another way, the duties
of judges may supplement, but cannot negate, the professional duties of law clerks.
(Another example is that while judges lack an express duty of confidentiality,105 law
clerks are doubtlessly bound by the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.)
Rule 7.1-3 of the FLSC Model Code requires lawyers to report other lawyers
to the law society in a range of circumstances:
Unless to do so would be unlawful or would involve a breach of solicitorclient privilege, a lawyer must report to the Society:
(a) the misappropriation or misapplication of trust
monies;
(b) the abandonment of a law practice;
(c) participation in criminal activity related to a
lawyer’s practice;
(d) conduct that raises a substantial question as to
another lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or
competency as a lawyer;
(e) conduct that raises a substantial question about the
lawyer’s capacity to provide professional services; and
(f) any situation in which a lawyer’s clients are likely
to be materially prejudiced.106

This duty applies to all lawyers individually. Thus, for example, an articled student or
junior lawyer has the duty to report regardless of whether the senior lawyer for whom
they work, or the firm’s managing partner, agrees that a report is necessary or
appropriate.
Judges do not have the same duty to report lawyers to the law society—if in
fact they have such a duty at all. Ethical Principles for Judges provides the following
guidance:
It is a delicate question whether and in what circumstances a judge should
report, or cause to be reported, a lawyer to the lawyer’s professional
governing body…. [G]enerally a judge should take, or cause to be taken,
appropriate action where the judge has clear and reliable evidence of serious
misconduct or gross incompetence by a lawyer.107

105

See above note 44.

106

FLSC Model Code, supra note 7, r 7.1-3. For a discussion see John Chapman, “Am I My Partner’s
Keeper? The Duty to Report a Colleague” (2013) 92:3 Can Bar Rev 611.

107

Ethical Principles, supra note 67 at 22, commentary 14. The commentary also deals with when such a
report should be made, i.e. during a proceeding versus after the proceeding has concluded.

268

UNBLJ RD UN-B

[VOL/TOME 71

Judges may witness firsthand “conduct that raises a substantial question as to another
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or competency as a lawyer” or “conduct that raises
a substantial question about the lawyer’s capacity to provide professional services”.
They also may learn of such conduct secondhand from the record before them, be that
conduct that is the subject matter of the litigation, for example in a malicious
prosecution matter, or conduct by counsel below, for example in an appeal based on
inadequate assistance by counsel. But reporting is only triggered when it reaches the
threshold specified in Ethical Principles. Moreover, Ethical Principles itself is
explicitly not a binding code,108 and thus it is inaccurate to refer to this as a reporting
duty.
In contrast, law clerks—who may become aware of the same conduct when
their judge does, or before or after—do have a duty to report it to the law society, with
a lower threshold than judges’ reporting. Lawyers are required to report not only
“serious misconduct” or “gross incompetence”, but also “conduct raising a substantial
question as to” integrity or capacity. In the same way that a senior partner cannot
decide that his juniors will not make a report, a judge has no ability to absolve a law
clerk of this duty. Even if the judge does not want to make a report, indeed even where
the judge determines that the conduct would not merit a report under FLSC Model
Code rule 7.1-3, the law clerk has a duty to use her own judgement and make a report
if she determines that one is required. The only exception to this duty is where the
information for the report is privileged.109
Part 4: Law Society jurisdiction and judicial independence
In this part I argue that, while law clerks practice law and law clerks’ ethics are legal
ethics, the law societies’ regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction over law clerks is at
least largely incompatible with judicial independence. More specifically, the
requirement that law clerks be articled students or lawyers under the jurisdiction of,
and in good standing with, the law societies impedes the constitutionally protected
administrative independence of the judiciary. This is because each law society is
external to the judiciary and exercises power, albeit independently, delegated through
legislation.110
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In the PEI Judges Reference, Lamer CJ identified the three core
characteristics of judicial independence as “[s]ecurity of tenure, financial security, and
administrative independence”, and the two dimensions of those characteristics as
individual and institutional.111 Chief Justice Lamer quoted approvingly from Valente
v The Queen on the meaning of administrative independence: “the administrative
decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function….
assignment of judges, sittings of the court, and court lists—as well as the related
matters of allocation of court rooms and direction of the administrative staff engaged
in carrying out these functions”.112 He also specified that “administrative
independence… only attaches to the court as an institution (although sometimes it may
be exercised on behalf of a court by its chief judge or justice.)”, and thus has only an
institutional and not individual dimension.113
While the principle of judicial independence does not preclude legislative and
executive power over the justice system, it does constrain the exercise of that power.
For example, “[l]egislatures have the constitutional power over the creation,
transformation and abolition of judicial offices. However, legislatures must exercise
this power in a way that complies with the constitutional principle of judicial
independence.”114 This constraint applies specifically to protect administrative
independence:
The legislative powers exercised by the province under s. 92 [of the
Constitution Act, 1867] are subject to constitutional requirements and, in
particular, are limited by the principles of judicial independence.
Accordingly, the provincial Legislature's authority over the administration
of justice in Ontario, and the Attorney General's statutory duties regarding
the administration of justice, must be exercised consistently with the
principles of judicial administrative independence.115

Thus, both legislative and executive power are constrained by the administrative
independence of the judiciary.
The question thus becomes whether the “direction of the administrative staff
engaged in carrying out these functions”, noted by Lamer CJ as a facet of
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administrative independence, encompasses the power to select law clerks and the
exclusive power to discipline them. If it does, the specific interference with judicial
independence is the ability of the executive, acting through the self-regulating law
society, to restrict the judiciary’s choice of law clerks through the law society’s
regulatory and disciplinary powers. That is, legislation on the legal profession may
purport to provide that the judiciary may only employ clerks who are lawyers admitted
to the bar (or articled students admitted to the licensing process), and the law society
can discipline these lawyers and articled students for conduct in the course of their
judicial service. In other words, the court can only direct law clerks who are in good
standing with the law society and so long as they remain in good standing with the law
society.
Despite the extensive and obvious differences between law clerks and
prosecutors, at a constitutional level there are similarities between prosecutorial
independence, as discussed in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, and judicial
independence as it relates to law clerks.116 The court in Krieger recognized that the
constitutional principle of prosecutorial independence restricted, but not eliminated,
the ability of both courts and law societies to interfere with the conduct of Crown
prosecutors:
It is a constitutional principle that the Attorneys General of this country
must act independently of partisan concerns when exercising their
delegated sovereign authority to initiate, continue or terminate
prosecutions. So long as they are made honestly and in good faith,
prosecutorial decisions related to this authority are protected by the doctrine
of prosecutorial discretion.117

It followed from this principle that the law societies could not, and the courts would
not, interfere with conduct of Crown prosecutors acting within prosecutorial
discretion.118 Likewise, judicial independence is a constitutional principle that, I argue,
restricts law society disciplinary and regulatory jurisdiction.119
Krieger, however, was fundamentally about the relationship between the law
society and the Attorney General. Unlike prosecutors, the question for law clerks is
about the respective roles of the law society and the judiciary. In Krieger, the
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unsuccessful argument was that the Attorney General should have sole control over
the regulation of Crown prosecutors.120 However, the law society’s regulatory role was
narrowed to conduct outside prosecutorial independence, including dishonesty and
bad faith of a Crown prosecutor.121
An argument parallel to that in Krieger would be stronger in the context of
judicial independence than in the context of prosecutorial independence.122 Law
societies’ regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction over law clerks, in the performance
of their professional duties, is to some extent contrary to judicial independence.
However, like in Krieger, that jurisdiction is narrowed but not necessarily eliminated
by the relevant constitutional principle. In a similar way as law societies maintain
jurisdiction over Crown prosecutors outside prosecutorial discretion, law societies
may maintain jurisdiction over law clerks outside the course of their duties. For
example, a law clerk’s extraprofessional misconduct could arguably be subject to law
society regulation, as could bad-faith conduct, if he or she happened to be an articled
student or a lawyer.
It would also follow from my analysis that law clerks, during their clerkships,
are exempt from any regulatory or disciplinary consequences for not complying with
basic regulatory requirements for good standing that apply to all lawyers, such as
mandatory continuing professional development.
I acknowledge here that my analysis may appear to undercut itself. I have
argued that law clerks practice law and are subject to the professional obligations of
lawyers, but I have also argued that law clerks, in the course of their practice, are
beyond law society jurisdiction. I have two responses. The narrower response is that
law society jurisdiction over law clerks may merely be restricted, not eliminated. The
broader response is that an exclusive focus on enforcement and discipline reflects a
thin conception of legal ethics.
I have argued that it is the lawyer role in the lawyer-client relationship, as
opposed for example to the employee role in the employer-employee relationship, that
is determinative of law clerks’ ethics. Nonetheless, as in Krieger, the relevant
constitutional principle may mean that no professional or regulatory consequences,
only employment consequences, are available for misconduct within the scope of the
constitutional principle. In Krieger, prosecutorial independence in effect meant that
the only possible consequences for the good-faith exercise of prosecutorial discretion
were internal employment consequences. For law clerks, judicial independence in
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effect means that the only possible consequences for the good-faith exercise of law
clerks’ duties rest with the employer. In this respect, law society requirements may be
largely unenforceable by the law society—but that does not mean they are hollow or
merely aspirational. Law clerks should strive to meet the spirit and letter of these
obligations, and judges and courts should expect them to do so. Indeed, it is public
confidence in the judiciary that may suffer consequences, if not the clerk himself or
herself, for a breach of these rules. Moreover, for those law clerks who are articled
students and those who wish to become lawyers, it would be open to law societies to
consider any such breaches as evidence against good character when it comes time for
the former law clerk to apply for admission to the bar.
A major exception here is post-service restrictions. Just as post-service
restrictions on former judges are a matter for the law society and not the Canadian
Judicial Council, and do not impede judicial independence, so too are post-service
restrictions for former judicial law clerks a legitimate matter for the law society that
does not impede judicial independence.
Of course, it is open to the courts to impose law society membership, as a
lawyer or a student-at-law, and compliance as a condition of employment (although,
as mentioned above, many courts do not do so123). By doing so, they would in effect
be accepting any implications for judicial independence. Moreover, there may indeed
be reasons that law clerks may wish to be articled students or lawyers, despite the fact
that judicial independence provides that such status cannot be required of them. The
most obvious reason is to complete articling requirements, and thus to become licensed
as a lawyer, sooner rather than later—or, for lawyers, to accrue a year of seniority at
the bar.
Reflections and conclusion
In this article, I have offered a new doctrinal account of the ethical duties of law clerks.
This account is rooted in the fact that law clerks practice law, and thus in the lawyerclient relationship between the law clerk and the judge, the professional duties of
lawyers, and specifically the duty to encourage respect for the administration of
justice. These ethical duties are professional duties, i.e. duties as lawyers that are
enforceable by the law society. However, I have also argued that law society
jurisdiction over law clerks is restricted though not necessarily eliminated by the
constitutional principle of judicial independence.
Under my account, law clerks are practicing lawyers and so share the
professional duties of all practicing lawyers, but because of the identity and the nature
of the client, the duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice
incorporates at least some duties of the judge. I have focused on impartiality and
outside interests. In this respect, the duties of lawyer are the same as the duties of the
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judge. I have also focused on post-service restrictions. In this respect, the animating
principles are the same as those animating restrictions on judges returning to practice,
but their application is different. However, the duties of the judge supplement, but do
not detract from, the professional duties of the law clerk. I have focused here on the
duty to report a fellow lawyer to the law society. Another example is that while judges
lack an express duty of confidentiality,124 law clerks are doubtlessly bound by the
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.
My analysis has focused primarily on judicial law clerks at the Supreme
Court of Canada, as these are the only group specifically described in the existing
literature. My conclusions should be applicable to all judicial law clerks. But further
empirical research is needed on the role and duties of law clerks at other courts. Further
research is also warranted on other lawyers to the judiciary, such as staff lawyers and
executive legal officers.
Given my analysis, how should law clerks be situated among public sector
lawyers? Law clerks, if indeed they are properly understood as lawyers, are not
properly considered government lawyers under typical definitions. Government
lawyers are generally understood to be lawyers for the executive branch of
government.125 Law clerks are unique in that they may be employees of the executive,
but their client is the judiciary.126 However, there are some similarities between the
two. Sanderson explains government lawyers as having three layers of duties, as
lawyers, as delegates of the Attorney General, and as public servants: “The first set of
professional duties comes with their membership in provincial and territorial law
societies. The second set of public law duties comes with their responsibilities to the
Minister of Justice and ex officio, Attorney General. The third set comes with their
employment in the public service.”127 Law clerks share two of these layers. They are
lawyers (or articled students) practicing law and are thus subject to the professional
duties of all lawyers. They are also public servants.128 But they are not delegates of the
Attorney General—indeed, as the government is the most common litigant, this would
be untenable.
Under Sanderson’s analysis, these layers of duties have conceptual and
practical implications because each layer is imposed, and therefore adjudicated, by a

124

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.

125

See Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxiii; Martin, supra note 1 at 271.

126

Martin, supra note 1 at 271.

127

Sanderson, supra note 1 at 48.

128

See e.g. Wilner, supra note 2 (“clerks are normally hired as public servants who are paid with public
funds [citation omitted]” at 622). Their status as public servants is in itself problematic: law clerks present
a microcosm in the tension between judicial independence and executive control over court resources. Law
clerks provide services to the judiciary, with the executive controlling their pay and benefits.

274

UNBLJ RD UN-B

[VOL/TOME 71

separate authority. In particular, the law societies only have jurisdiction over the
professional layer of duties, not the others.129
Law clerks unquestionably have special duties because of the nature of their
work and the nature of their client. These duties might appear to be a third layer—
perhaps a “public interest” lawyer or “public duties” layer,130 like that of government
lawyers as delegates of the Attorney General. I argue, however, that these special
duties are best understood as part of the professional duties layer and are derived from
the duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice. Thus, they are
enforceable by the law society subject to the considerable limits imposed by judicial
independence.
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